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Letter from the 
President
As this publication goes to print, we are slowly 
closing the books on one of the most tumultuous 
economic periods since the Great Depression. 
An infection in the American housing sec-
tor spread like an epidemic through financial 
markets to countries around the world. In a matter 
of months, economic growth in developing and 
developed countries alike shifted abruptly into 
reverse. International trade collapsed. Manufactur-
ing activity plummeted. Employment growth hit a 
wall before beginning a painful decline. No nation 
was spared the contagion’s effects as the global 
economy was dragged forcefully to the edge of a 
precipice.
A global crisis of historic magnitude necessi-
tated a commensurate global response. Monetary 
policy makers around the world quickly began to 
work together—announcing coordinated policy 
movements and establishing swap lines for foreign 
exchange.
The events of this crisis underscore an impor-
tant fact: We live in a truly interconnected world. 
What happens beyond our borders can have a 
significant impact on our domestic economy and, 
as a result, on U.S. monetary policy.
It was that fact that motivated my decision in 
2005 to make the study of globalization and its im-
plications for the conduct of monetary policy the 
Dallas Fed’s signature research issue. That directive Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2009 Annual Report • Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   3
The Fed must remain 
abreast of international 
developments if it is to 
deliver on its mandate for 
price stability.
culminated in the fall of 2007 with the formation of 
our Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute.
Under its auspices, top minds from around 
the globe have come together to explore the 
linkages between an increasingly interconnected 
global economy and monetary policy. In the 
two years since the institute’s establishment, its 
research team—under the advisement of profes-
sional and academic experts, including two central 
bank governors and one Nobel laureate—has gar-
nered considerable attention. Staff members have 
presented their findings at conferences across the 
country and published their research in some of 
the profession’s leading journals.
These individuals have also contributed 
significantly to the Federal Reserve’s understand-
ing of our most recent crisis. For instance, in his 
essay entitled “The Financial Crisis, Trade Finance 
and the Collapse of World Trade,” Director Mark 
Wynne cuts through headlines lamenting the end 
of globalization to identify potential factors behind 
the recent collapse in world trade. Wynne argues 
that the trade declines of the Great Recession were 
likely a result of deteriorating global economic 
activity and a drying up of trade finance. His 
analysis provides evidence that protectionist poli-
cies—while always dangerous enough to warrant a 
watchful eye—are not yet on a significant rise.
Members of institute staff were called upon by 
the Federal Open Market Committee—the Federal 
Reserve’s principal policymaking group—to pres-
ent their work on inflation dynamics. These indi-
viduals provided analytical support for the notion 
that price pressures at home can be affected by 
economic slack abroad. While empirical evidence 
remains fragile, one thing is clear: The Fed must 
remain abreast of international developments if it 
is to deliver on its mandate for price stability.
In the 2009 Annual Report of the Dallas Fed’s 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, read-
ers will learn more about these research efforts 
and activities over the past year. Members of this 
elite team are at the leading edge of economic 
research and continue to build on the institute’s 
reputation for excellence in the study of globaliza-
tion and its impact on monetary policy. While they 
have not yet found all the answers, I am confident 
that they continue to ask the right questions. My 
colleagues and I are most grateful for their efforts 
and look forward to the insights we will derive 
from their important work.
Richard W. Fisher
President and CEO
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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The financial crisis that began in August 2007 
and intensified in the fall of 2008 pushed the global 
economy into its most severe recession since 
World War II. As 2009 drew to a close, there were 
signs that economic activity in many countries was 
rebounding, but the fragile state of many countries’ 
financial systems and concerns about how govern-
ments and central banks will manage the exit 
strategies from the extraordinary measures taken 
to mitigate the worst effects of the crisis leave 
many open questions about the ultimate course of 
the recovery. World trade collapsed in 2008–09 at 
a pace not seen since the Great Depression, raising 
concerns that the financial crisis would lead to 
deglobalization—a reversal of the globalization 
that has characterized the past three decades. As 
global economic activity has rebounded, trade 
flows have picked up as well, allaying some of 
these fears. But the scale and the speed of the 
collapse of global trade warrants investigation and 
poses a challenge for some standard models of 
international economics.
In this essay I will discuss the impact that the 
crisis had on world trade. I will then review two ex-
planations for the severity of the collapse. One line 
of argument holds that given the normal behavior 
of trade flows over the course of the business 
cycle and given the severity of this most recent 
cyclical downturn, a major contraction of world 
trade should have been expected. A second line of 
argument, which is not incompatible with the first, 
holds that the financial crisis had an independent 
effect on trade flows, over and above the effect 
it had on global economic activity, by limiting or 
severing access to trade finance. We will see that 
the decline in trade was excessive, even given the 
severity of the recession. And there is evidence 
that reduced access to trade finance is an impor-
tant part of the overall explanation.
What Has Happened to Global  Trade?
Despite the recent increase in the importance 
of international trade in services—long considered 
the quintessential nontradable—the bulk of inter-
national trade still consists of trade in goods and 
commodities. Each month the CPB Netherlands 
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis produces 
a report on global trade in goods, along with a 
breakdown for the major groupings. Chart 1 shows 
the time series of global exports of goods since 
January 1991, when the series began. Following 
steady growth over most of the past decade, global 
exports peaked in the first half of 2008 (specifical-
ly, in April 2008) and then posted a precipitous 20 
percent decline through the early months of 2009. 
(The trough month was January 2009, but exports 
hovered at close to their January level through 
May 2009.)1 As economic activity in many parts 
of the world started to recover in the latter half of 
2009, trade volumes picked up, and at the time of 
writing, the volume of trade had increased 15.5 
percent from May through December 2009. 
The Financial Crisis,
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What was extraordinary about this trade 
collapse was its scale and breadth. The 20 per-
cent decline from peak to trough in the series in 
Chart 1 is the biggest in the history of that specific 
measure. Global trade declined during the 2001 re-
cession, but only by 7 percent. Other measures of 
global trade with a longer time series show that the 
decline was the largest since World War II, indeed 
the largest since the Great Depression.2 
Furthermore, the trade collapse was wide-
spread. As Table 1 shows, the collapse was not 
confined to the advanced economies that were 
at the epicenter of the financial crisis, but encom-
passed the emerging economies as well. Exports 
of the advanced economies—defined here as 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) excluding Turkey, South 
Korea and Mexico—peaked in April 2008 and 
then declined 23.3 percent through January 2009. 
Japan’s exports peaked earlier and saw by far the 
largest decline, while U.S. exports peaked a bit later. 
Exports of the emerging economies also peaked 
in April 2008, with central and eastern Europe and 
Latin America peaking in January 2008, whereas 
Asian exports did not peak until July. By early 2009, 
exports had turned around in most regions of the 
world, with Latin America being the last to experi-
ence recovery. Just as Japan experienced the most 
severe downturn, so too has it experienced the 
sharpest rebound. But the advanced economies as 
a whole seem to be lagging, held back in particular 
by the weak recovery of euro-area exports. 
Why Did  Trade Collapse?
Many explanations have been proposed for 
the scale of the collapse in trade. One immediate 
concern was that countries were raising tariff and 
nontariff barriers to trade flows to protect domes-
Chart 1
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tic industries from the worst of the downturn. 
While there was a very real increase in protection-
ist rhetoric over the course of 2008 and 2009, there 
is very little evidence to date that this rhetoric 
translated into more restrictive trade policy. Even-
ett (2009) is less sanguine on this topic, noting 
a steady increase in the number of protectionist 
measures implemented during 2009. He finds that 
for several advanced economies the share of goods 
affected by beggar-thy-neighbor policies exceeds 
precrisis levels. However, given the short history 
and nature of the data upon which this assess-
ment rests, it is difficult to know how important 
the effects are at the aggregate level. Importantly, 
Evenett also notes that “… few governments have 
introduced anything like across-the-board dis-
crimination against foreign commercial interests; 
in this respect, the world economy is still far from a 
1930s-style protectionist outcome.” 
Policymakers seem to have absorbed the 
lesson of the Great Depression, when protectionist 
trade policy exacerbated the downturn.3 Meeting 
in London in April 2009, the leaders of the Group 
of Twenty publicly declared that they would “… 
not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism 
of previous eras.” In the most recent report from 
the OECD, the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development and the World Trade Organiza-
tion on trade and investment policy responses to 
the downturn in the G-20, it was noted that the 
responses so far have been “relatively muted” 
(OECD, UNCTAD, WTO 2010). In the period Octo-
ber 2008 to October 2009, new import-restricting 
measures introduced by the members of the G-20 
covered about 1.3 percent of G-20 imports (0.8 
percent of global imports). In the more recent 
period from September 2009 through February 
2010, new import-restricting measures covered 
0.7 percent of G-20 imports. The report also noted 
that no major measures had been identified as 
reducing market access among the G-20 members 
in the service sector, although it did draw attention 
to the potentially distortionary effects of govern-
ment support for the transportation and financial 
sectors in a number of countries.  
To get a sense of what constitutes the normal 
behavior of trade over the course of the business 
cycle, it is useful to look at the time series behavior 
of trade and economic activity in tandem. Chart 2 
plots the growth rate of global real gross domestic 
product (GDP) and the growth rate of global ex-
ports of goods and services over the past 25 years. 
Two points are worthy of note. First, global exports 
tend to move in tandem with global GDP: The cor-
There is very little 
evidence to date that this 
protectionist rhetoric 
translated into more 
restrictive trade policy.
Table 1
Financial Crisis  Takes Widespread  Toll on World Exports 
  Peak month  Trough month  Peak to trough  Trough to december 2009
      (percent change)  (percent change)
Advanced economies  April 2008  January 2009  –23.3  12.6
     U.S.  July 2008  April 2009  –24.7  20.2
     Euro area  April 2008  February 2009  –23.1  8.4
     Japan  January 2008  March 2009  –41.4  40.3
Emerging economies  April 2008  January 2009  –21.5  22.0
     Asia  July 2008  January 2009  –24.7  29.5
     Latin America  January 2008  August 2009  –21.1  20.9
     Central and eastern Europe  January 2008  May 2009  –30.8  12.9
     Africa and Middle East  April 2008  April 2009  –12.8  8.5
SOURCE: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis World Trade Monitor, December 2009.Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2009 Annual Report • Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   7
relation between the growth rates of the two series 
over the sample period is 0.84. That is, exports 
are procyclical: They tend to boom when real 
economic activity is booming and to slump when 
real economic activity is slumping. Second, global 
exports are a lot more volatile than global GDP. 
The standard deviation of the growth rate of global 
GDP from 1986 to 2009 was 1.3 percent, while 
the standard deviation of the growth rate of global 
exports over the same period was 4.6 percent. 
We see the same pattern at the level of individual 
countries. Engel and Wang (2007) report a series 
of statistics on trade patterns in the OECD coun-
tries and show that the median (across countries) 
correlation between the cyclical components of 
imports and GDP is 0.61, while the median corre-
lation between the cyclical components of exports 
and GDP is 0.45. Likewise, they show that imports 
are about three times more volatile than GDP in 
the OECD countries, while exports are 2.7 times 
more volatile than GDP.4 
Why is that? Part of the reason appears to 
be that despite recent innovations the composi-
tion of international trade is still heavily skewed 
toward goods rather than services. Approximately 
80 percent of all global trade consists of trade in 
goods, and this share has remained remarkably 
stable over time. By contrast, the share of goods 
in global GDP has declined by about 10 percent-
age points over the past four decades, from about 
a half in 1970 to slightly more than one-third in 
recent years. Close to 70 percent of U.S. exports 
by value are exports of goods, while goods make 
up about 84 percent of U.S. imports (by value). By 
comparison, goods production accounts for only 
about one-fifth of overall production in the United 
States (measured as a share of value added).5 Fur-
thermore, the goods traded across international 
Chart 2
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borders tend to be durable rather than nondu-
rable. Table 4 of Engel and Wang (2007) reports 
the share of durable goods in the imports and 
exports of the OECD countries and shows that the 
median share in recent decades has been around 
60 percent.
So, international trade flows tend to move 
with the business cycle; indeed, they tend to 
increase by more in good times and decline by 
more in bad times than the rest of the economy. It 
should not then come as a great surprise that inter-
national trade flows have dried up in the midst of 
the most severe global recession since World War 
II. Far from telling us about incipient deglobaliza-
tion, as some feared at the time, some of the de-
cline in trade was a natural cyclical phenomenon.
The Excess  Trade Collapse
It appears that the decline in trade was greater 
than one might have expected, given what hap-
pened over the same period to the usual determi-
nants of trade flows, specifically the relative price 
of the traded goods and the level of economic 
activity. For example, following Chinn (2009), 
Wynne and Kersting (2009) estimate a simple 
model of U.S. import demand that relates real im-
ports of goods and services into the United States 
to U.S. real GDP and the real value of the dollar. A 
priori one would expect imports to be positively 
related to real GDP and negatively related to the 
real value of the dollar, and a simple model along 
these lines does a reasonably good job at captur-
ing the quarter-to-quarter changes in the growth of 
U.S. imports over the past three decades. However, 
the model predicted a decline in U.S. imports of 3.7 
percent in first quarter 2009, but the actual decline 
(in the vintage of data used in the Wynne and 
Kersting study) was 11.3 percent.6
A similar exercise is reported in Levchenko, 
Lewis and Tesar (2009). However, rather than es-
timate an import demand equation for the United 
States, they perform a “wedge accounting” exercise 
of the sort pioneered by Cole and Ohanian (2002) 
in their study of the Great Depression and Chari, 
Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) in their study of 
postwar U.S. business cycles.7 Levchenko, Lewis 
and Tesar start with demand relationships that 
express domestic consumption of foreign output 
(or imports) as a function of the price of foreign 
goods relative to domestic goods (with a constant 
elasticity) and the scale of domestic economic 
activity (with a constant elasticity of unity). They 
then calculate for each quarter since 1968 how far 
actual trade flows are from the levels predicted 
by these demand relationships. They report that 
in second quarter 2009, U.S. imports were a lot 
lower than would have been predicted based on 
this simple relationship. In Chart 3 I show my own 
estimates of the trade wedge over the same period. 
The collapse in 2009 stands out. The trade wedge, 
the deviation of trade from levels predicted by 
relative prices and the level of economic activity, 
was –33 percent in the first quarter of 2009 and 
–40 percent in the second. This suggests that the 
financial crisis had a more direct impact on trade 
flows, over and above the effect it had through the 
decline in economic activity. Why? One possibil-
ity is that stress in the financial system caused 
financial institutions to cut back on trade finance 
to exporting firms. 
Access to  Trade Finance as an 
Explanation
Before proceeding, we might pause to ask 
exactly what trade finance is.8 The broadest defini-
tion of trade finance includes every kind of loan, 
insurance policy or guarantee that is directly tied 
to an international sale of a good or service. This 
definition captures anything from direct trade 
credit extended by an exporter to an overseas cus-
tomer to government-backed guarantees issued by 
a country’s official export credit agency. The other 
key institutions involved in trade finance are com-
mercial banks, multilateral development banks 
and private insurers. In addition, various trade fi-
nance instruments are used to insure against risks 
some of the decline in 
trade was a natural 
cyclical phenomenon.Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2009 Annual Report • Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   9
arising from international transactions, such as 
commercial risk, transportation risk and political 
risk. According to some estimates, about 80 to 90 
percent of global trade relies on trade finance, and 
most of this finance is short-term in nature.9 
The form that trade finance takes will typically 
depend on the degree of trust between the two 
parties engaged in trade and the degree to which 
one or both parties is dependent on bank financ-
ing. Transactions that involve only the exporter 
and importer can be done on a cash-in-advance 
basis (where the importer pays the exporter before 
the goods are shipped) or on an open-account 
basis (where the exporter is paid after the goods 
are shipped to the importer). The latter arrange-
ment constitutes an extension of trade credit in 
the usual sense by the exporter to the importer. 
Cash in advance is used mainly when the importer 
has particularly high credit risk or is located in a 
country with high political risk. Cash in advance is 
least risky from the perspective of the exporter and 
most risky from the perspective of the importer. 
The allocation of risks is reversed when the trans-
action takes place on open account. 
Between these two extremes, banks offer a va-
riety of products to offset the risk of nonpayment 
or nondelivery. A letter of credit is a commitment 
by a bank on behalf of the importer that payment 
will be made as soon as the terms and conditions 
in the letter are satisfied. With a letter of credit, the 
exporter need no longer be concerned about the 
creditworthiness of the importer, but only with the 
creditworthiness of the issuing bank. However, 
letters of credit are typically the most expensive 
form of trade finance. A less expensive option is 
documentary collection, where the exporter uses 
a bank as its agent to collect payment from the 
importer once it presents the shipping documents 
Chart 3
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to the bank. While the bank facilitates payment 
of the exporter, it does not offer any guarantee, so 
documentary collection is typically cheaper than a 
letter of credit. Banks also offer export credit insur-
ance when goods are sold on open account and 
also finance exports through working capital loans. 
What can we say quantitatively about the 
impact of the financial crisis on the availability of 
trade finance? Surprisingly little, it turns out. There 
are no comprehensive measures of the volume of 
trade finance outstanding or indicators of its cost 
or availability. Such measures as do exist provide 
at best a partial picture of what is happening. As 
Auboin (2009) notes, at present the only source of 
reliable data on trade finance is the Berne Union 
database, which covers trade credit insurance. 
When concerns about the availability of trade 
credit were at their peak in the fall of 2008, the 
International Monetary Fund conducted a survey 
of major banks in emerging markets and advanced 
economies in conjunction with the Bankers’ Asso-
ciation for Finance and Trade to get a more com-
plete picture of the state of trade finance.10 More 
than 70 percent of the banks surveyed noted that 
the prices of letters of credit had risen relative to 
2007, while more than 90 percent reported higher 
rates for short- and medium-term lending facilities 
where the goods exported served as collateral. 
Unsurprisingly, most of the survey respondents at-
tributed the higher prices to their increased cost of 
funds. While exporters everywhere were confront-
ed with higher trade finance costs, the decline in 
trade finance availability occurred primarily in the 
emerging markets. Trade among advanced econo-
mies seemed largely unaffected by the availability 
(or otherwise) of trade finance, while the availabil-
ity of financing for imports from South Asia, South 
Korea and China had decreased sharply. 
Research by Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) 
shows that banking crises generally do have an 
impact on exports. They disentangle the effects 
of banking crises from the effects of other types 
of shocks that might affect exports (specifically, 
demand shocks) and find that the exports of 
manufacturing sectors that are more dependent 
on external finance tend to grow significantly more 
slowly than other sectors during a banking crisis. 
However, what appears to be key is dependence 
on bank finance as opposed to other forms of 
external finance (for example, trade credit), which 
would be consistent with the idea that the avail-
ability of trade finance declines during banking 
crises. Iacovone and Zavacka also find that sectors 
with more tangible assets that can be used as col-
lateral also tend to do better in terms of maintain-
ing exports during a banking crisis.11 
Additional historical evidence that access to 
trade finance has important implications for firms’ 
exports is provided by Amiti and Weinstein (2009). 
They use a unique Japanese data set that allows 
them to match banks to individual firms to exam-
ine the consequences of the Japanese financial 
crises of the 1990s for Japanese manufacturing ex-
ports over that decade. Japanese exports declined 
6.7 percent in 1993 and 7.1 percent in 1999.12 The 
first decline came on the heels of the first round 
of bank problems following the bursting of the 
stock price and real estate bubbles in 1989 and 
1991, respectively. The second decline in exports 
was preceded by an intensification of the financial 
crisis in late 1997 that culminated in the national-
ization of the Long-Term Credit Bank (at the time 
the eighth-largest bank in the world) at the end of 
1998. For each firm in their sample, which covers 
the period 1986 to 1999, they are able to identify 
its main “reference bank,” which is the bank that 
would typically handle the firms’ payment settle-
ment and foreign exchange dealings, that is, trade 
finance needs. Amiti and Weinstein find a statisti-
cally significant relationship between the health 
of these banks (as measured by changes in their 
market-to-book ratios) and firms’ export growth. 
Specifically, a deterioration in the health of a firm’s 
main reference bank is usually followed within a 
year by a decline in its exports. They also find that 
while a deterioration in bank health also has a det-
While exporters everywhere 
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  Trade and Shipping
With the collapse of global trade, there was a simultaneous 
collapse in the demand for shipping services to transport goods in-
ternationally. According to media reports, by the summer of 2009 
almost 10 percent of the global merchant shipping fleet (container 
ships, bulk carriers, tankers, car carriers and so on) had been laid 
up due to the collapse in trade. Naturally this manifested itself 
in shipping costs. While we do not have a good comprehensive 
measure of what it costs to ship goods around the world, the 
chart shows the recent behavior of two closely watched indexes. 
The Baltic Dry Index tells us what is going on in one segment of 
the shipping market, namely that for dry bulk commodities such as 
coal, iron ore and grain. After peaking at 11,793 on May 20, 2008, 
the index collapsed to 663 on Dec. 5, 2008 (a decline of just over 
94 percent), before posting gradual improvements over the course 
of 2009 and into 2010. The HARPEX index, produced on a weekly 
basis by the shipbroking firm Harper Petersen, is a measure of 
the cost of shipping containers. Unlike the Baltic Dry Index, it has 
yet to show signs of a recovery. As of Jan. 1, 2010, the HARPEX 
index stood at 317.44, down from a precrisis peak of 1,444.62. 
The differential behavior of the two cost indexes over the past 
year as trade volume picked up is interesting and probably reflects 
capacity problems in the container liner services. This segment 
of the shipping market, which accounts for close to two-thirds of 
the market for seaborne trade, expanded dramatically as supply 
chains became more globalized. 
Movements in shipping costs reflect a number of factors. 
The capacity of the global merchant shipping fleet adjusts only 
slowly in response to increased demand due to greater trade vol-
umes. Rapid growth in the demand for shipping capacity to move 
raw materials to China and other emerging markets is believed 
to have been instrumental in the run-up in the Baltic Dry Index 
in 2007 and 2008. However, higher energy prices probably also 
played a role. Oil prices, as measured by the price of West Texas 
Intermediate, peaked at $145.66 a barrel on July 11, 2008. (Prices 
of fuel oil—No. 2 New York—peaked the same day at $4.0425 
a gallon.) The peak in oil prices came just two months after the 
peak in the Baltic Dry Index, and then the two series declined 
dramatically over the remainder of 2008. Both series have since 
shown a steady improvement. The tight correlation between the 
two series suggests that oil prices are an important component 
of overall shipping costs. But it is also consistent with both series 
being driven by a common third factor—global economic activity.12   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas • Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2009 Annual Report
rimental effect on domestic sales, the effect is a lot 
smaller than the effect on exports, consistent with 
the view that exporting is a particularly finance-
dependent activity due to its greater riskiness.
But is there any evidence that the drying up of 
trade finance contributed to the excessive decline 
in global trade during the recent crisis? Levchenko, 
Lewis and Tesar (2009) investigate the possibility 
that a collapse of trade credit was a key determi-
nant of the collapse of U.S. imports and exports 
over the period June 2008 through June 2009 by 
examining import and export performance over a 
large number of sectors and asking whether those 
sectors that are most dependent on trade credit or 
most willing to extend it saw larger declines. They 
are unable to find any statistically significant rela-
tionship, and they conclude that a collapse of trade 
credit is not a plausible candidate for explaining 
the excess decline. 
However, this finding needs to be interpreted 
with caution. The terms trade credit and trade 
finance are often used interchangeably, but as we 
have noted above, there are important differ-
ences.13 The term trade credit is best defined as 
credit created or extended by a nonfinancial firm 
to one of its customers when there is a mismatch 
in time between when goods are ordered and 
delivered and when they are paid for. Trade credit 
in this sense is reflected in the accounts receiv-
able on a firm’s balance sheet (with a matching 
amount showing up in the accounts payable on 
the customer’s balance sheet.) Levchenko, Lewis 
and Tesar (2009) employ exactly such measures of 
trade credit (either accounts payable relative to the 
cost of goods sold or accounts receivable relative 
to total sales) to assess whether a contraction in 
trade credit played an important role in the con-
traction of global trade. Of course, such measures 
do not distinguish between trade credit extended 
to domestic customers (or received from domestic 
vendors) and trade credit extended to foreign cus-
tomers (or received from foreign vendors). Trade 
finance, as it pertains to international trade, is best 
understood as the entire array of financial prod-
ucts that serve to facilitate international trade. This 
includes—in addition to that portion of trade credit 
extended to or received from foreign customers or 
vendors—bank loans to finance working capital 
to produce for export; letters of credit; insurance; 
and the host of other financial products that exist 
to mitigate the risks associated with international 
trade.
Some indirect evidence that access to trade 
finance was indeed a critical factor contributing to 
the 2008–09 decline in global trade is presented 
by Chor and Manova (2009). Their idea is to use 
interbank lending rates in different countries as 
a measure of the cost of external capital (includ-
ing trade finance) to firms. They interpret higher 
interbank rates as being indicative of tighter credit 
markets, and they document that countries with 
higher rates tend to export less to the United 
States. Of course, the need to access external 
finance varies across sectors, as does the ability 
to post collateral for loans or the ability to obtain 
trade credit. Chor and Manova show that coun-
tries with tighter credit conditions suffered a larger 
decline in exports to the United States during the 
crisis, and these effects were most apparent in the 
sectors that were most dependent on external fi-
nance, had the fewest collateralizable assets or had 
the least access to trade credit from trade partners. 
Based on reduced-form estimates, they conclude 
that “… U.S. imports would have fallen by 25.6% 
more if interbank rates had remained at their 
peak September 2008 level through April 2009, es-
sentially doubling the actual percentage decline in 
trade volumes observed after September 2009.”
The findings of Chor and Manova are consis-
tent with the findings of Bricongne et al. (2009) for 
French exporters. They look at the performance 
of about 100,000 individual French exporters 
through April 2009 and find that firms in sectors 
more structurally dependent on external finance 
experienced the biggest declines in exports. 
However, their data do not allow them to distin-
The availability of trade 
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guish between finance for international trade and 
finance for generic working capital.
So, evidence in support of the trade finance 
story is, at best, suggestive. A more conclusive 
evaluation of the idea will depend on better 
measures of trade finance becoming available. 
But the evidence does highlight the need for a 
better understanding of finance’s role in facilitating 
international trade and points to the existence of a 
financial accelerator for exports similar to that gen-
erally believed to exist for real economic activity.
Conclusions
In 2008–09, global trade collapsed at a pace 
not seen since the Great Depression, raising con-
cerns in some quarters that the globalization of the 
past three decades was going to be reversed. Global 
trade has since recovered (although it has yet to 
attain its precrisis level), and to date there seems 
to have been limited use of protectionist measures. 
However, given the prospect of elevated unemploy-
ment levels in many countries for some time to 
come, the pressures to engage in some form of pro-
tectionism will remain and will continue to pose 
a threat to free trade. Much of the decline in trade 
can be explained by the severity of the downturn 
in economic activity. But some of the decline was 
excessive, over and above what would have been 
warranted by the collapse in activity. 
In this essay, I have focused on limited access 
to trade finance as a possible explanation for the 
excessive decline. Existing models of international 
trade do not assign a prominent role to access 
to trade finance as an important determinant of 
trade. And data limitations make it very difficult to 
determine just how important a role trade finance 
plays empirically. But the limited evidence avail-
able suggests that access to trade finance is an 
important determinant of a firm’s ability to export 
and that the declines in exports to the United 
States were greatest among firms in countries 
where access to finance was already limited and 
for firms that were most dependent on external 
finance, had the fewest collateralizable assets and 
had the least access to trade credit. 
Finance is often viewed as a veil on the engine 
of the real economy, but as has been observed, 
“when the veil flutters, the engine sputters.” The 
collapse of global trade in 2008–09 has drawn 
attention to the little-studied area of trade finance 




1 An alternative measure of global trade from the OECD’s 
Main Economic Indicators tells a similar story. After 
peaking at $2.606 trillion (measured in year 2000 dollars) 
in first quarter 2008, global imports of goods and services 
declined to a low of $2.164 trillion in second quarter 2009 
(a decline of just under 17 percent), before rebounding in 
the third quarter. The OECD’s measure of global exports of 
goods and services peaked at $2.572 trillion (2000 dollars) 
in second quarter 2008. This was not all that different 
from the first quarter figure of $2.271 trillion. The exports 
measure bottomed out at $2.160 trillion in second quarter 
2009 (a decline of 16 percent) and subsequently rebound-
ed. The OECD measure has the advantage of including 
trade in services as well as having a longer time series 
than the CPB measure. However, it tends to lag the CPB 
series in terms of availability and also relies more heavily 
on projections for a number of countries rather than actual 
published data.
2 For example, the measure of global exports reported as 
part of the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics database, which starts with April 
1949, showed exports declining by 25 to 30 percent (on a 
12-month basis) each month from January through August 
2009. The only declines of comparable magnitude in this 
measure occurred in 1956, when exports fell about 20 per-
cent each month from June through December. However, 
these statistics measure nominal rather than real trade 
volumes. The measure of global exports of goods and ser-
vices that the OECD reports as part of its Main Economic 
Indicators is a real series (measured in constant 2005 
dollars). This series starts in first quarter 1970. In the first 
and second quarters of 2009, global exports as measured 
by this series posted declines in excess of 14 percent (on a 
four-quarter basis) in both quarters, the largest declines in 
the series’ history. 
3 The extent to which the resort to protectionism during the 
Great Depression contributed to the severity of the Depres-
sion is the subject of some controversy. Mario Crucini and 
James Kahn (1996) were the first to conduct a quantitative 
analysis of tariffs’ contribution to the decline in economic 
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activity during the Great Depression. They showed that 
even when international trade constitutes a small share 
of aggregate output, tariffs and other trade barriers can 
have a significant negative effect on GDP if the goods that 
are traded are used as intermediate inputs in production. 
They conclude that the tariff war during the 1930s could 
have reduced U.S. gross national product by as much as 2 
percent.
4 The statistics that Engel and Wang (2007) report are 
based on Hodrick–Prescott filtered data with smoothing 
parameter of 1600. 
5 Goods production (defined as the sum of agriculture, min-
ing, construction and manufacturing) accounts for a slightly 
higher share of gross output, closer to 30 percent.
6 The most recent vintage of the National Income and 
Product Accounts puts the decline of first quarter 2009 at 
10.7 percent.
7 See also Ahearne, Kydland and Wynne (2005) and 
Cociuba and Ueberfeldt (2008) for examples of wedge ac-
counting exercises, albeit in closed-economy frameworks.
8 See chapter 18 of Bekaert and Hodrick (2009) for a 
lengthy exposition of various options for financing interna-
tional trade, or see U.S. Department of Commerce (2008).
9 See, for example, Auboin (2009).
10 See Dorsey (2009) and International Monetary Fund 
(2009).
11 According to Table 2 of Iacovone and Zavacka, tangible 
assets are 62 percent of the total assets of firms in the 
petroleum refining sector but a mere 14 percent of assets 
in the office and computing sector. 
12 Exports also declined 1.8 percent in 1998 but posted 
increases in every other year of the decade.
13 See also the discussion in footnote 2 of Amiti and Wein-
stein (2009) on the differences between the accounting and 
finance uses of these terms.
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Summary of Activities
For 2009, the Dallas Fed had two high-
priority objectives that pertained to research: 
“Produce high-quality current analysis and 
long-term research that enable the Dallas Fed to 
be an active player and intellectual leader in the 
Federal Open Market Committee’s monetary 
policy deliberations” and “Promote research 
that deepens our understanding of the implica-
tions of globalization for U.S. monetary policy 
through the Globalization and Monetary Policy 
Institute.” Contributing to these two high-pri-
ority objectives, Enrique Martínez-García and 
Mark Wynne gave a presentation on the global 
slack hypothesis to the full FOMC at its Decem-
ber 2009 meeting. This presentation was part 
of a broader set of presentations on inflation 
dynamics. The paper underlying the presenta-
tion is forthcoming as a Staff Paper in 2010.
Academic Research
The core business product of the institute 
is its Working Paper series. By year end, we had 
circulated 40 papers in the series. One of the 
working papers contributed by our advisory 
board member William White on “Should Mon-
etary Policy ‘Lean or Clean’?” received some 
high-profile press coverage and was one of the 
most downloaded publications on our website 
in 2009. 
However, working papers are just an 
intermediate step—the ultimate objective is 
to have the research meet the standards of the 
peer-reviewed literature and be published in 
academic journals. Jian Wang’s paper “Home 
Bias, Exchange Rate Disconnect, and Optimal 
Exchange Rate Policy,” which was circulated as 
Research Department Working Paper No. 0701, 
was accepted for publication at the Journal of 
International Money and Finance in December 
2008 (too late for inclusion in last year’s annual 
report). Anthony Landry’s paper “Expectations 
and Exchange Rate Dynamics: A State-Depen-
dent Pricing Approach,” which was circulated as 
Research Department Working Paper No. 0604, 
was accepted for publication at the Journal of 
International Economics in December 2008. 
Ananth Ramanarayanan’s paper “Vertical 
Specialization and International Business Cycle 
Synchronization” (joint with Costas Arkolakis 
of Yale University), which appeared as Institute 
Working Paper No. 21, was accepted for publica-
tion in the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
in a December 2009 special issue of that journal 
on “Heterogeneous Firms and International 
Trade.” Enrique Martínez-García’s paper “In-
vestment and Trade Patterns in a Sticky-Price, 
Open-Economy Model” (coauthored with 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 
research associate Jens Søndergaard of the Bank 
of England) was accepted for publication in a 
book of conference proceedings. (For recent 
working paper abstracts, see page 30.)
Bank Publications
The institute published eight international 
updates on the web and five Economic Letters 
on “Seeking Stability: What’s Next for Banking 
Regulation?” (by Simona Cociuba), “Trade, 
Globalization and the Financial Crisis” (by 
Mark Wynne and research associate Erasmus 
Kersting), “Ties that Bind: Bilateral Trade’s Role 
in Synchronizing Business Cycles” (by Ananth 
Ramanarayanan), “Has Greater Globalization 
Made Forecasting Inflation More Difficult?” Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2009 Annual Report • Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   17
(by Mark Wynne and Patrick Roy) and “Labor 
Market Globalization in the Recession and 
Beyond” (by W. Michael Cox, Richard Alm and 
Justyna Dymerska). The institute also published 
one Staff Paper on “Exchange Rate Policies” 
by senior fellow Charles Engel. The staff also 
received some external recognition for their 
contributions to Bank publications. The Winter 
2009 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, a publication of the American Economic 
Association, highlighted Anthony Landry’s 2008 
Economic Letter on “The Big Mac: A Global-to-
Local Look at Pricing” in its Recommendations 
for Further Reading listing. Simona Cociuba’s 
Economic Letter on bank regulation is featured 
on the St. Louis Fed’s website dedicated to the 
financial crisis.
Conferences and Seminars
Institute economists have been active over 
the past year presenting their work at conferenc-
es and seminars. Staff gave several presentations 
at the January 2009 meeting of the American 
Economic Association and organized sessions 
at the meeting. In April, the institute organized a 
conference on “Globalization, Political Economy 
and Trade Policy” jointly with the Department 
of Economics at Southern Methodist University. 
(More details are provided in the conference 
summary on page 18.) On Oct. 1–2, we hosted 
the annual meeting of the Federal Reserve 
System Committee on International Economic 
Analysis at the San Antonio Branch. On Nov. 
13–14, we hosted a joint conference with the 
Bank of Canada on international capital flows 
at the Dallas office. (More details are provided 
in the conference summary on page 24.) The 
institute also cosponsored a conference with the 
O’Neil Center for Global Markets and Freedom 
at SMU on Oct. 16 on “What Do Businesses Need 
to Succeed in Today’s Global Economy?”
Staff presented their research at a num-
ber of prestigious venues (such as the Bank 
of England and the Bank for International 
Settlements), as well as several high-profile 
conferences (most notably the Econometric 
Society North American summer meeting and 
the Canadian Economics Association annual 
meeting). Mark Wynne gave a series of lectures 
on “Globalization and Financial Services” at the 
American Bankers Association Stonier National 
Graduate School of Banking at the University of 
Pennsylvania in June. 
The institute hosted a number of external 
seminar speakers over the course of the year, and 
we added 11 research associates to our network. 
(A list of all the research associates is on page 44.)
Other Activity
Governor Masaaki Shirakawa of the Bank of 
Japan formally joined the advisory board of the 
institute effective July 3, and Heng Swee Keat, 
managing director of the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, joined the advisory board in August. 
A key component of the institute’s strategy 
to promote research and raise the visibility of 
the Dallas Fed in the broader research commu-
nity is to run a very active visitor and seminar 
program. We hosted a number of visitors over 
the summer, including Ina Simonovska of the 
University of California at Davis, Karen Lewis of 
the University of Pennsylvania, Pengfei Wang of 
Hong Kong University of Science and Tech-
nology and Chikako Baba of the University of 
Wisconsin and IMF. Erasmus Kersting, a recent 
Texas A&M Ph.D. and currently a visiting as-
sistant professor at SMU, spent the summer 
working  with Mark Wynne on a project on 
international trade finance and its role in the 
contraction of global trade over the last year. 
Tatsuma Wada from Wayne State University be-
gan an extended visit to the institute in Septem-
ber. Several of these visitors have subsequently 
joined our network of research associates. 
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On April 24 and 25, 2009, the Globalization 
and Monetary Policy Institute joined with South-
ern Methodist University to cosponsor a confer-
ence on Globalization, Political Economy and 
Trade Policy at SMU’s Collins Executive Education 
Center. Nine scholarly papers were presented and 
discussed in three sessions. 
The first session consisted of two papers 
describing offshoring’s impact on the distribution 
of work and the relative unemployment and wages 
of unskilled labor. A third offering focused on how 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from more-
to less-developed countries influence innovation. 
The second session started with a paper 
focusing on the rationale for multilateral trade 
agreements, followed by two presentations on in-
ternational protection of intellectual property. The 
first two papers  in the last session concern export 
dynamics, and the third discusses the relationship 
between bilateral trade agreements and multilat-
eral trade liberalization. 
Offshoring and FDI
Princeton University professor Gene Gross-
man presented the conference’s first paper, titled 
“Task Trade Between Similar Countries” and 
coauthored with his Princeton colleague Esteban 
Rossi-Hansberg. 
Most models treat the objects of international 
trade as final goods, not abstract tasks. However, 
final goods are produced by combining the 
outputs of the tasks, which might be regarded as 
similar to intermediate goods. This final step has to 
be done in the headquarters country. In a previ-
ous paper, the authors proposed a theory of task 
trade between countries with dissimilar relative 
factor endowments, generating interesting results 
that differ from the traditional factor endowment-
based Heckscher–Ohlin model. 
In the present paper, Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg propose a theory of task trade between 
countries that have similar relative factor endow-
ments but differ in size. Firms produce differenti-
ated goods by performing a continuum of tasks, 
each of which generates local spillovers. Tasks can 
be performed at home or abroad, but offshoring 
costs vary. A crucial assumption is that the tasks 
are characterized by external economies of scale 
at the national level.
In equilibrium, tasks with the highest offshor-
ing costs may not be traded at all. Among the 
remainder, those with higher offshoring costs are 
performed in the country that has higher wages 
and aggregate output. When offshoring costs 
aren’t too high, firms concentrate certain tasks in 
particular locations to realize external economies 
of scale. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg discuss 
the relationship between equilibrium wages, equi-
librium outputs and relative country size, examin-
ing how the pattern of specialization reflects the 
Conference on Globalization, 
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model’s key parameters. 
The theory predicts the pattern of task special-
ization for countries that differ only in size. The 
authors find an equilibrium always exists in which 
the larger country has higher wages and greater 
aggregate output of final goods. 
If offshoring costs are low enough and the 
countries aren’t too different in size, another equi-
librium may exist in which the smaller country 
has higher wages and greater aggregate output. In 
either case, the country with the higher wages and 
output performs tasks that are more difficult and 
costly to offshore. 
Syracuse University professor Devashish 
Mitra presented the second paper, titled “Search 
and Offshoring in the Presence of ‘Animal Spirits,’” 
coauthored with Priya Ranjan of the University of 
California at Irvine. 
The authors introduce two sources of unem-
ployment in a two-factor, closed-economy general 
equilibrium model—search frictions and fairness 
considerations. Models with search friction are the 
most widely used for analyzing unemployment 
in a general equilibrium setting. Recently, mod-
els with fairness considerations have generated 
increasing interest. 
Basically, this kind of model assumes un-
skilled workers demand wages that aren’t too far 
below those of skilled workers. This normally leads 
to unemployment of unskilled workers but not 
necessarily skilled workers.
 In the present paper, the authors find that 
a binding fair-wage constraint increases the 
unskilled unemployment rate and can at the same 
time lead to a higher jobless rate for skilled work-
ers. The wages of unskilled workers increase and 
the wages of skilled workers decrease. 
Next they introduce offshoring of unskilled 
jobs into the model, which makes it more likely 
that the fair-wage constraint becomes bind-
ing. Offshoring of unskilled jobs always leads to 
increases in unskilled unemployment, decreases 
in skilled unemployment and increases in skilled 
workers’ wages. The unskilled wage can increase or 
decrease as a result of offshoring.
The opening session’s final paper, titled 
“Southern Innovation and Backward Knowledge 
Spillovers: A Dynamic FDI Model,” was presented 
by professor Keith E. Maskus of University of 
Colorado at Boulder and coauthored with his col-
league Yin He. 
The focus is a theory concerning the trade and 
FDI relationships between the more-advanced 
countries of the North and the less-developed 
countries of the South. 
The authors develop a model in which the 
portion of Northern firms choosing to become 
multinationals is endogenous. In the benchmark 
model, Northern firms engage in innovation 
based on the local knowledge stock and learning-
by-doing (LBD), and a share of these products is 
transferred to Southern production via FDI. An 
increase in Southern imitation limits the rate at 
which countries become multinational. 
Up to this point, the model is pretty standard. 
The Maskus and He innovation involves extending 
the model to permit Southern innovation based on 
the amount of local knowledge and LBD. Because 
Southern firms have higher innovation costs, this 
generates inefficient specialization in both regions 
and reduces global growth. The authors also allow 
for “backward spillovers” to Northern innovation, 
which partially restores global efficiency and 
growth. 
Backward spillovers from the South to the 
North do occur. In his presentation, Mascus point-
ed out that the video compact disk was invented 
in China, but the technology wasn’t patented. A 
Japanese firm learned and patented the technol-
ogy, which eventually evolved into the DVD.
The model’s results highlight a possibility not 
widely recognized. Specifically, technology trans-
fer through multinational investment tends to rise 
with a decline in imitation risk, perhaps achieved 
through strengthening intellectual property pro-
tection. Thus, multinationals may kick off a process 20   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas • Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2009 Annual Report
in the South in which local imitation and LBD 
establish the possibility of domestic innovation as 
R&D costs fall. 
In equilibrium, however, all Southern firms 
that innovate and invest in multinational sub-
sidiaries must obtain the same economic return 
and cover both the innovation costs and the FDI 
setup cost. This implies that costs of innovation 
will remain higher in the South than the North. As 
a result, inefficient specialization can reduce FDI 
and global knowledge accumulation. 
To counter this, a Southern policy of strength-
ening intellectual property protection and reduc-
ing the costs of inward investment can expand 
multinational contacts and growth, an effect 
enhanced by backward spillovers to the advanced 
countries. 
Trade and Intellectual Property
Stanford University professor Kyle Bagwell 
kicked off the second session with “Profit Shifting 
and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly Competitive 
Markets,” coauthored with his Stanford colleague 
Robert W. Staiger. 
The authors have been leaders in the analysis 
of multilateral trade agreements. They argue that 
countries constrained by such agreements are less 
likely to alter the terms of trade in their favor and 
impose negative externalities on other countries. 
Their previous work has mainly concentrated on 
perfectly competitive markets. 
Under imperfect competition, trade policies 
can alter the terms of trade, shift profits from one 
country to another and moderate or exacerbate 
existing distortions associated with monopoly 
power. In light of the various ways trade policies 
may influence welfare, we might expect that new 
rationales for trade agreements would arise under 
imperfectly competitive markets. 
In their paper, the authors consider a se-
quence of trade models that feature imperfectly 
competitive markets, finding the same basic 
rationale for trade agreements as under perfectly 
competitive markets. In all the models, address-
ing inefficient terms-of-trade restrictions in trade 
volume is the only rationale for trade agree-
ments—whether or not governments have political 
or economic objectives. 
Having identified the problem trade agree-
ments might solve, Bagwell and Staiger proceed to 
the next step and evaluate the form that efficiency-
enhancing pacts might take. Once again, their 
results parallel the established results for models 
with perfectly competitive markets. 
In particular, Bagwell and Staiger show that 
the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimi-
nation (i.e., most-favored-nation provisions) are 
efficiency-enhancing because they undo the 
terms-of-trade restrictions in trade volume that 
occur when governments pursue unilateral trade 
policies. 
The analysis suggests that the important im-
plications of the terms-of-trade approach are quite 
general, applying not just to perfectly competitive 
but also to a wide range of imperfectly competitive 
markets. However, they emphasize that this paper 
considers only markets for which the number of 
firms is fixed. 
In a companion paper in 2008, they consid-
ered imperfectly competitive models in which the 
number of firms is endogenous. They concluded 
that the inefficiencies associated with terms-of-
trade motivations provide the only rationale for 
trade agreements in this setting as well.
Edwin Lai of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas presented the next paper, “Innovation, 
Intellectual Property Protection and Globaliza-
tion,” coauthored with Davin Chor of Singapore 
Management University. 
Patent protection often takes the form of 
restrictions on how easily innovators are allowed 
to invent around existing patents, which the au-
thors term “patent breadth.” Lai and Chor explore 
the implications of a patenting regime based on 
patent breadth by incorporating such intellectual 
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provement model of technology, trade and growth.
 The authors first study how changes in pat-
ent breadth affect innovation rates and welfare 
in a closed-economy benchmark. In considering 
whether to increase patent breadth, policymakers 
face a tradeoff between the benefits of higher in-
novation rates and the costs of higher prices from 
granting patent-holders monopoly pricing power 
for a longer duration. They find an optimal breadth 
under certain reasonable conditions, suggesting 
government intervention to protect intellectual 
property will improve welfare. 
The paper goes on to formulate an open-
economy model in which countries interact 
through trade and firms patent internationally. 
They find a stable equilibrium for patent breadth 
in which national governments underprotect intel-
lectual property from a global perspective. 
This result is similar to findings in a 2004 
paper by Lai and Grossman, which analyzed 
international patent protection based on duration 
rather than breadth. Interestingly, home and for-
eign patent-breadth policies are strategic comple-
ments—at least in the symmetric equilibrium. 
This contrasts with Grossman and Lai’s finding 
that home and foreign patent-length policies are 
strategic substitutes. 
In the present paper, Lai and Chor also find 
that countries with larger domestic markets or 
lower innovative capabilities would tend to set 
larger patent breadths. In addition, globalization’s 
reduced trade frictions lead countries to lower 
patent breadths. As a result, globalization actually 
leads to lower equilibrium research intensities in 
all countries. Other studies have found that global-
ization has no general impact on research intensi-
ties, making this result even more surprising. 
  Next on the program was professor Lee 
Branstetter of Carnegie Mellon University, who 
presented a paper titled “Intellectual Property 
Rights, Imitation and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Theory and Evidence,” coauthored with Columbia’s 
Raymond Fisman, Harvard’s C. Fritz Foley and 
SMU’s Kamal Saggi. 
The paper analyzes the effects of strengthen-
ing intellectual property rights in developing coun-
tries on the level and composition of industrial 
development. The authors first develop the theory 
of a North–South product cycle in which Northern 
innovation, Southern imitation and FDI are all 
endogenous. 
The theory predicts that intellectual property 
rights reform in the South leads to increased FDI 
from the North as developed country firms shift 
production to less-developed country affiliates. 
This FDI accelerates Southern industrial develop-
ment, bringing increases in both the South’s share 
of global manufacturing and the pace at which 
production of recently invented goods shifts to 
the South. In addition, the model predicts that 
Northern resources will be reallocated to R&D as 
production shifts to the South, driving an increase 
in the global rate of innovation. 
The authors go on to test the model’s predic-
tions by analyzing the responses of U.S.-based 
multinationals and domestic industrial production 
to intellectual property rights reforms in the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
First, they find that multinational companies 
expand the scale of their activities in countries that 
reform intellectual property rights. Multinationals 
that make extensive use of intellectual property 
disproportionately increase their use of these 
inputs. 
Second, there is an overall expansion of 
industrial activity after intellectual property rights 
reform, and highly disaggregated trade data indi-
cate an increase in the number of initial exports 
in response to reform. These results suggest that 
the expansion of multinational activity more than 
offsets any decline in indigenous firms’ acquiring 
intellectual property through imitation.
Export Dynamics and  Trade Pacts
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presented by New York University professor Jona-
than Eaton and coauthored with Marcela Eslava, 
C. J. Krizan, Maurice Kugler and James Tybout. 
A goal of policy in many developing countries 
is establishing new markets for nontraditional 
exports. Well-known success stories from Latin 
America include Brazilian regional jets, Chilean 
wines and Colombian cut flowers. By finding new 
buyers abroad, governments hope to create jobs, 
bolster demand for their currencies and further 
industrial development. 
The paper presents a preliminary theoretical 
framework for analyzing export dynamics at the 
firm level. Specifically, the authors assume that 
export success reflects a process of search and 
learning in foreign markets. Producers interested 
in a particular overseas market devote resources to 
identifying potential buyers. When they find one, 
they learn something about their products’ appeal 
in this market. They also learn about the potential 
for profits by observing the experiences of rivals 
selling similar products in the foreign market. 
Taking stock of the available information, 
firms initially not selling in the foreign market 
update their beliefs about potential export profits, 
and they adjust the intensity of their search efforts 
accordingly, attempting to maximize their net 
expected profit streams. Export gains take place 
when firms receive positive early signals about 
potential profits, both from their own experiences 
and from rivals’ experiences, and they intensify 
their search and marketing efforts, adding quickly 
to their foreign client base.
World Bank economist Caroline Freund 
presented the next paper, “Export Entrepreneurs: 
Evidence from Peru,” coauthored with her World 
Bank colleague Marta Denisse Pierola. 
Like the previous paper, this one considers 
the dynamics of exporting firms’ entry and exit. 
In developing countries, many exporters produce 
only for foreign markets. These firms tend to be 
larger and more productive than firms focused 
on the domestic market, and they often produce 
several products and export to many markets.
To understand this type of export entrepre-
neurship, Freund and Pierola examine data on 
Peru’s nontraditional agriculture exports from 
1994 to 2007. This sector grew sixfold over the 
period, driven in large part by firm entry and new 
product and market discoveries. 
The authors identify a pattern of trial and er-
ror: Firms frequently enter and exit both products 
and markets. Exits are more likely after one year 
and among firms that start small. Large exporters 
tend to be the first to discover products and mar-
kets new to their country, and they export more 
products to more markets. 
Freund and Pierola develop a model that 
explains how entrepreneurs decide to develop 
new export products and markets in a business 
environment characterized by sunk costs of 
discovery and uncertainty about costs and foreign 
demand. The model explains many features of the 
Peruvian data. 
The authors’ theoretical framework assumes 
uncertainty about exporting and sunk costs—this 
leads to a process of trial and error, with a high 
share of exits after one year. Good entrepreneurs 
develop large firms that tend to export more to a 
given product and market, enter more markets 
and more products, and enter new markets and 
products earlier. Firms also start small and grow 
exports over time to avoid large losses from un-
competitive products. The data seem to confirm 
these predictions.  
The conference’s last paper was “Bilateral-
ism, Multilateralism and the Quest for Global Free 
Trade,” presented by Ryerson University professor 
Halis Murat Yildiz and coauthored with Kamal 
Saggi of SMU.
 Whether bilateralism is a stepping stone or 
stumbling block to multilateral trade liberalization 
has long been a topic of intense debate. This paper 
develops an equilibrium theory of trade agree-
ments and evaluates the relative merits of bilateral-
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The authors envision a three-country game in 
which each nation faces a range of policy options 
in negotiating trade agreements—join with both 
trading partners (i.e., practice free trade), select 
just one of them for a bilateral pact, or don’t deal 
with either of them (i.e., opt for the status quo un-
der which all countries impose their optimal tariffs 
on each other). 
To determine whether bilateralism matters, 
they also analyze this game under the assump-
tion that countries follow a purely multilateral 
approach to trade liberalization. Thus, both the 
degree and nature of trade liberalization are en-
dogenously determined.
 First, Yildiz and Saggi find that global free 
trade is the only stable equilibrium, regardless 
of whether countries can pursue bilateral agree-
ments. This lends support to the view that bilateral 
trade agreements aren’t stumbling blocks to multi-
lateral trade liberalization. 
The second finding focuses on countries with 
asymmetric endowment levels. For them, there ex-
ist circumstances under which free trade is a stable 
equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue 
bilateral trade agreements. This supports the view 
that bilateral trade agreements are stepping stones 
to multilateralism. These results hold even when 
governments are politically motivated—that is, 
they value producer interests and tariff revenue 
more than consumer benefits that come from freer 
trade.
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Conference on Capital Flows, 
International Financial Markets 
and Financial Crises
Financial markets throughout the world have 
become increasingly more developed in recent 
decades. At the same time, global financial integra-
tion has risen: Cross-border financial flows and as-
set holdings have increased significantly over time, 
showing deepening financial-market linkages 
between countries. Economists in various fields 
have been addressing the effects of more sophisti-
cated financial markets and international financial 
integration, but many open issues remain. These 
include evaluating the degree and the macroeco-
nomic effects of financial integration, assessing 
the role of regulating financial intermediaries and 
understanding the emergence and transmission of 
financial crises. 
The current global financial crisis has brought 
to light the need to develop a better understand-
ing of these issues and their implications for 
policymaking. To this end, on Nov. 13–14, 2009, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and the Bank 
of Canada cosponsored a conference on capital 
flows, international financial markets and financial 
crises.1 The purpose of the conference was to bring 
together researchers working on various aspects of 
financial markets and financial crises. Many of the 
papers presented at the conference addressed one 
of two broad questions. The first is, how integrated 
are international financial markets and how effec-
tive are they at sharing resources and risk? Second, 
what are the channels through which financial 
	 	
markets—and their regulation—impact the rest 
of the economy? Specifically, do they result in 
stabilization or amplification of macroeconomic 
fluctuations in response to shocks? The remainder 
of this summary explains why this research is fruit-
ful in the context of the current financial turmoil 
and summarizes the researchers’ contributions.
Why We Need Better Models
Two of the conference papers nicely illustrate 
how the global dimension of the current financial 
crisis underscores the need to develop and apply 
new theoretical models to address these questions. 
Steve Kamin from the Federal Reserve Board 
presented evidence (in a paper coauthored with 
Laurie Pounder from the Federal Reserve Board) 
on the degree to which direct financial links 
with the U.S. help explain the different effects on 
foreign countries’ financial markets. Specifically, 
Kamin and Pounder ask whether the exposure of a 
country’s financial sector to U.S. mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) or its dependence on U.S. dollar 
funding can explain how the financial sector in 
that country fared early in the crisis. This question 
is motivated by the fact that, up until late 2008, the 
crisis had very different effects on many foreign 
1The papers presented can be found online at dallasfed.org/
institute/events/09capital.cfm. The names mentioned in bold 
throughout this summary are those of the presenters at the 
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countries. If these differences depend closely on 
how much those countries were linked to the 
markets for U.S. MBS or short-term U.S. dollar 
funding—arguably the markets where the financial 
crisis originated—then the way the financial crisis 
was transmitted abroad would be fairly clear. For-
eign financial institutions that directly held a lot of 
U.S. MBS would have sustained tremendous losses 
when the market for these assets turned sour, and 
foreign institutions dependent on dollar funding 
would have run into trouble when funding in these 
markets dried up. However, interestingly, Kamin 
and Pounder find that these direct financial links 
explain very little of the decline in financial sector 
indicators in foreign countries; some with very 
little exposure to U.S. MBS had quite negative ef-
fects on their financial institutions, and vice versa.
In a paper coauthored with Shang-Jin Wei 
from Columbia University, Hui Tong from the 
IMF also addressed the issue of how the effects 
of the current crisis were transmitted abroad. 
Tong and Wei’s paper, in contrast to Kamin and 
Pounder’s, looks at how nonfinancial firms fared in 
countries with different levels of dependence on 
foreign capital flows. The paper asks whether firms 
operating in sectors that tend to depend heavily 
on outside financing experienced more severe 
liquidity problems in countries more dependent 
on foreign capital inflows. Tong and Wei find that 
while higher overall inflows of foreign capital 
were associated with more severe effects on firms, 
the composition of capital flows matters as well. 
Foreign capital in the form of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) was less a culprit than non-FDI capital. 
The reasoning behind this may be that FDI, in the 
form of foreign multinationals buying out exist-
ing firms or creating subsidiaries, is a more stable 
source of foreign financing than non-FDI capital, 
including debt or portfolio equity investment. 
These two papers show how thinking about 
the current financial crisis brings one back to the 
two main questions raised above. If financial mar-
kets in different countries are so integrated that 
crises in one market affect others, it is important to 
understand financial integration in the first place—
the degree to which it has progressed and the 
reasons it has done so. Moreover, the various chan-
nels of international financial transmission are not 
obvious, so it is also important to understand what 
they are and how they work.
How Integrated Are Financial Markets?
It is common to point to the rise of cross-
border asset holdings as evidence of international 
financial integration. While such observations 
tell us a lot about how integrated economies are, 
they leave open the questions of why this trade in 
financial assets matters, and what exactly are the 
frictions or conditions that make financial markets 
more or less imperfect. For these reasons, a long 
line of research has used theoretical models to 
understand the role of financial market integration 
and the degree to which certain market frictions 
can rationalize the observed data. In the context 
of short-run economic fluctuations, standard 
theory provides a role for international financial 
markets to move resources to their most produc-
tive location, as well as to share risk. International 
trade in financial assets allows a country with a 
boom to receive investment from abroad, tempo-
rarily importing more than it exports. In addition, 
domestic and foreign households trade financial 
assets to smooth out fluctuations in their income 
stream and consumption. The level of financial 
market integration can in part be understood from 
measuring how effective these mechanisms are, 
and four of the conference papers approach this 
task from different angles. 
The basic idea of shifting resources to where 
they can be most productively used implies that 
country pairs with highly integrated financial 
markets should have less synchronized output 
fluctuations than country pairs with less financial 
integration. However, the rise of global financial 
integration has coincided with more interna-
tional business cycle synchronization, not less. 
Conference on Capital Flows, 
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Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan from the University of 
Houston, in a paper with Elias Papaioannou from 
Dartmouth College and José Luis Peydró from 
the European Central Bank, sheds some light on 
this apparent contradiction. Their paper consid-
ers data on cross-border banking—the amounts 
of foreign assets and liabilities banks in a country 
have—to reevaluate the relationship between 
financial integration and output synchronization. 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydró find that 
when financial integration is measured at the level 
of individual banks, country pairs that are more 
integrated do have less synchronized business 
cycles; that is, there is evidence of the standard 
resource shifting mechanism. The main difference 
with previous work is the authors’ ability to use the 
microlevel bank data to control for common global 
factors that have increased both financial integra-
tion and business cycle synchronization over time. 
Importantly, however, the paper considers a time 
frame and set of countries that do not include ma-
jor financial disruptions, so it aims to understand 
the functioning of financial markets in “normal” 
times. Whether this is different from the transmis-
sion effects of financial markets during periods of 
financial stress is a topic that comes up in several 
other conference papers. 
Looking at implications for consumption rath-
er than output, Robert Kollmann from Université 
Libre de Bruxelles presented a paper addressing 
the risk-sharing role of international financial mar-
kets. Models with perfect financial markets predict 
that relative consumption between two countries 
should be tightly linked with the real exchange 
rate—the relative price of national consumption 
baskets, expressed in a common currency. This 
means that the functioning of financial markets 
ensures that households in a country whose 
consumption basket is relatively inexpensive 
compared with that of a trading partner temporar-
ily consume relatively more. Again, this is another 
prediction that is not borne out in the data, where 
there is a very weak relationship between relative 
consumption and real exchange rates. Kollmann 
presented a model in which some households 
do not have access to financial markets, a feature 
motivated by a widely noted observation that 
a large fraction of households in the U.S. actu-
ally hold no financial assets and therefore just 
consume their income. In Kollmann’s model, the 
presence of these “hand-to-mouth” consumers can 
break the link between aggregate consumption 
and real exchange rates. The lesson of the paper is 
that, from the perspective of sharing consumption 
risk, international financial integration is far from 
complete, but this has more to do with households’ 
access to financial assets than with the develop-
ment of financial markets.
In another paper highlighting the difference 
between international and domestic financial mar-
kets, Diego Valderrama from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco (in joint work with Kather-
ine Smith from the U.S. Naval Academy) considers 
Steve Kamin from the Federal 
Reserve Board and Alessandro 
Rebucci from Inter-American 
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why the composition of capital flows in developing 
economies is so different from that in industrial-
ized economies. Specifically, developing countries 
have large inflows of FDI and outflows—or smaller 
inflows—of debt, while developed economies tend 
to have the opposite pattern. Smith and Valder-
rama build on the observation that it is costlier in 
developing countries for firms to issue debt than it 
is in developed economies. This provides multina-
tional firms the incentive to purchase firms in de-
veloping countries and use their more developed 
financial markets to finance debt; FDI provides 
the channel for this. At the same time, households 
would like to save some of their income to smooth 
out fluctuations; they do this by lending abroad 
because of the higher costs domestic firms face 
to borrow. The message in this paper is again that 
seemingly incompatible observations can be ratio-
nalized as the product of individuals’ participation 
in financial markets, as imperfections in these 
markets affect their decisions and therefore also 
affect macroeconomic aggregates. 
While international trade in financial assets 
certainly has effects on consumption, output 
and the composition of capital flows, its most 
direct mechanical manifestation is simply in the 
balance of trade in goods. A country that imports 
more than it exports is borrowing from its trading 
partners, and a country whose exports outstrip 
imports is lending to its trading partners. Indeed, 
without cross-country trade in financial assets, 
there can be no gap between a country’s exports 
and imports. In reality, trade imbalances are signif-
icant—most clearly illustrated by the large and per-
sistent trade deficit of the U.S. with the rest of the 
world. In her paper at the conference, Wei Dong 
from the Bank of Canada asks what can account 
for the behavior of the U.S. trade balance in recent 
decades. The question is motivated by the obser-
vation that, prior to the early 1990s, a standard 
mechanism naturally stabilizing the trade balance 
seemed to be working: A country with a large trade 
deficit would experience an exchange rate depre-
ciation and expenditure on imports would decline, 
closing the deficit. Since the early ’90s, however, 
the U.S. has run a sustained trade deficit, despite 
a persistent depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Dong’s 
paper attributes this largely to the fact that imports 
and exports have become less sensitive to changes 
in their relative prices. She points to higher costs 
for domestic distribution and increased rigidity in 
prices as possible explanations for why changes in 
import and export prices do not pass through as 
strongly to the quantities of goods imported and 
exported. The paper addresses the need to think 
about international financial markets in the con-
text of a broader environment, including interna-
tional trade in goods. 
Channels of Financial  Transmission
The second broad set of questions addressed 
in the conference papers covers the mechanisms 
by which shocks are transmitted through the 
financial system to the rest of the economy. These 
questions are of direct relevance when thinking 
about the current financial crisis, and the papers 
covered various ways in which frictions in finan-
cial markets can propagate or amplify shocks to 
generate severe recessions. 
Three papers addressed in detail the effects 
of collateral and leverage in the financial system: 
those by Anton Korinek from the University of 
Maryland (coauthored with Olivier Jeanne from 
Johns Hopkins University), Michael Devereux 
from the University of British Columbia (coau-
thored with James Yetman from the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements, Hong Kong) and Enrique 
Mendoza from the University of Maryland. These 
papers all study a basic mechanism by which 
small shocks can trigger large real macroeconomic 
effects through asset prices. In the presence of 
a collateral constraint (alternatively a leverage con-
straint), individuals—such as banks, households or 
firms—cannot borrow more than a certain fraction 
of the value of their assets. When this constraint is 
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generate large effects: The value of collateral falls, 
causing borrowing and consumption to decline, 
which can reduce the value of assets further, caus-
ing a cycle of asset price declines and reduced bor-
rowing and consumption. The three papers apply 
this basic mechanism in various ways. 
Jeanne and Korinek explain how an economy 
borrowing from abroad can experience credit 
booms and busts that are inefficiently large from a 
social perspective. Rising asset prices increase the 
value of collateral and so allow further borrowing, 
making it more likely that the collateral constraint 
is eventually hit, triggering the decline described 
above. This is socially inefficient because of an 
externality: An individual who takes on more debt 
does not take into account the effect this action 
has on asset prices and therefore on others’ bor-
rowing constraints. As such, Jeanne and Korinek 
propose the classic solution to dealing with an 
externality: a tax on individuals’ borrowing. They 
argue that moderate taxes on foreign borrowing in-
hibit excessively large credit booms and therefore 
reduce or eliminate the chances of an economy 
experiencing severe credit busts.
Devereux and Yetman consider the effects 
of collateral constraints on the international 
transmission of shocks. The motivation for this 
question is the widely noted observation that 
the current financial crisis spread very quickly to 
many countries, even between those that did not 
have close links through international trade. The 
more important links between these countries 
may be through financial markets, but the channel 
of transmission through international financial 
linkages is not clearly understood. (In fact, the 
general intuition described in the previous sec-
tion, and one of the paper’s results, indicate that in 
normal times financial links should in fact dampen 
transmission of shocks.) Devereux and Yetman 
argue that the basic mechanism working through 
collateral constraints can explain international 
transmission of shocks through financial linkages. 
Since investors in a country diversify their asset 
holdings between domestic and foreign assets, 
shocks to the foreign country that decrease foreign 
asset prices can lower the value of the domestic 
investor’s collateral and therefore lower domestic 
borrowing and consumption because of a tighter 
collateral constraint. 
Mendoza’s paper is a contribution toward 
understanding if the effects of collateral con-
straints matter quantitatively for macroeconomic 
aggregates. Specifically, under standard assump-
tions on economic behavior, would we ever expect 
these constraints to have large macroeconomic 
effects? If so, what are the conditions for that to 
happen? Mendoza shows that, in fact, introducing 
collateral constraints into a standard quantitative 
theoretical framework can result in financial crises 
as infrequent, but recurrent, events. Importantly, 
a shock does not need to be exceptionally large 
or of unusual nature for a financial crisis to occur. 
The buildup of debt can bring the economy close 
Igor Livshits from the University 
of Western Ontario and Robert 
Kollmann from the Université 
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to its collateral constraint, when a small shock can 
trigger the declining asset price–collateral–bor-
rowing cycle described above. This type of event 
would be infrequent because households typically 
accumulate precautionary savings, which keeps 
them out of the region of debt where constraints 
threaten to bind. 
Two other papers in the conference, by Igor 
Livshits from the University of Western Ontario 
(coauthored with Koen Schoors from the Uni-
versity of Ghent) and Ali Dib from the Bank of 
Canada, illustrate the role of the banking sector in 
the transmission of shocks. Regulation on banks’ 
capital adequacy and leverage has been at the 
center of the discussion on reforming the financial 
system, so it is important to understand the bank-
ing system and how bank regulation affects the 
economy. 
Livshits’ paper addresses questions on how 
banking regulation should respond to changes in 
the riskiness of assets. Prudential banking regula-
tion aims to curtail excessive risk taking, and it is 
standard practice to do this by providing incen-
tives for banks to hold safe assets. However, when 
the risk of safe assets rises, the failure of banking 
regulation to recognize this change can make the 
banking system vulnerable. Livshits illustrates this 
with a stark example: In 1998, bank regulation in 
Russia considered the government’s debt to be 
safe, even as the risk of default on this debt was 
rising. This policy encouraged banks to gamble on 
risky currency securities to the point that when the 
government did finally default, the banking system 
crashed. This paper, therefore, carries important 
lessons on the effects of bank regulation and raises 
questions about the best way to induce efficient 
investment by banks.
Dib’s paper makes progress on understanding 
the macroeconomic effects of banking by intro-
ducing a banking sector that intermediates credit 
into a variant of the models used by many central 
banks for policy analysis. Typically, these models 
are silent on the effects of financial frictions and 
the transmission of shocks through financial inter-
mediaries, but Dib’s work presents a framework in 
which these effects can be studied. He finds that 
the presence of an active banking sector with a 
frictional interbank market can amplify the effects 
of supply-side shocks but dampen the effects 
of financial shocks. In addition, his framework 
provides a role for the sorts of unconventional 
monetary policies pursued by the Fed and many 
central banks over the past year, including liquidity 
injections and asset swaps. 
The overall lessons from the papers at this 
conference reflect the progress that comes with 
sharing insights among researchers working in 
various fields. Indeed, some of the clearest implica-
tions for understanding the current crisis in the 
U.S. may come from the work on emerging-market 
debt crises, as in the papers presented by Mendoza 
and Korinek. Another theme of the conference 
papers, aside from the topics each one addressed, 
was the integration of the analysis of “normal” eco-
nomic conditions with the study of crisis periods. 
From the perspective of understanding why crises 
happen and what the policy implications are, this 
is an extremely important step. The policy implica-
tions of some of the work presented at the confer-
ence reflect the importance of this integration. 
For example, both Korinek and Jeanne’s results 
and Mendoza’s paper show that it is important to 
consider how policies affect the incentives to accu-
mulate debt before a crisis. More generally, many 
of the other papers presented illustrate the need to 
understand the degree of integration of financial 
markets and the channels of financial transmis-
sion in order to form policy that works through 
their operation. The overall picture is encouraging 
for future research developing these ideas further.
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No. 21
Vertical Specialization and Interna-
tional Business Cycle Synchronization
Costas Arkolakis and Ananth Ramanarayanan
abstract: We explore the impact of vertical spe-
cialization—trade in goods across multiple stages 
of production—on the relationship between trade 
and international business cycle synchroniza-
tion. We develop a model in which the degree of 
vertical specialization is endogenously determined 
by comparative advantage across heterogeneous 
goods and varies with trade barriers between 
countries. We show analytically that fluctuations 
in measured productivity in our model are not 
linked across countries through trade, despite the 
greater transmission of technology shocks implied 
by higher degrees of vertical specialization. In 
numerical simulations, we find this transmission 
is insufficient in generating substantial depen-
dence of business cycle synchronization on trade 
intensity.
Published as “Vertical Specialization and Inter-
national Business Cycle Synchronization” in 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 111, no. 4, 
2009, pp. 655–80.
No. 22
The  Taylor Rule and Forecast Intervals 
for Exchange Rates
Jian Wang and Jason J. Wu
abstract: This paper attacks the Meese–Rogoff 
(exchange rate disconnect) puzzle from a dif-
ferent perspective: out-of-sample interval fore-
casting. Most studies in the literature focus on 
point forecasts. In this paper, we apply Robust 
Semi-parametric (RS) interval forecasting to a 
group of Taylor rule models. Forecast intervals for 
twelve OECD exchange rates are generated, and 
modified tests of Giacomini and White (2006) are 
conducted to compare the performance of Taylor 
rule models and the random walk. Our contribu-
tion is twofold. First, we find that in general, Taylor 
rule models generate tighter forecast intervals than 
the random walk, given that their intervals cover 
out-of-sample exchange rate realizations equally 
well. This result is more pronounced at longer hori-
zons. Our results suggest a connection between 
exchange rates and economic fundamentals: 
economic variables contain information useful 
in forecasting the distributions of exchange rates. 
The benchmark Taylor rule model is also found to 
perform better than the monetary and PPP mod-
els. Second, the inference framework proposed 
in this paper for forecast-interval evaluation can 
be applied in a broader context, such as inflation 
forecasting, not just to the models and interval 
forecasting methods used in this paper.Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2009 Annual Report • Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   31
No. 23
Exchange Rate Pass-Through in a 
Competitive Model of Pricing-to-Market
Raphael Auer and Thomas Chaney
abstract: This paper extends the Mussa and Rosen 
(1978) model of quality-pricing under perfect 
competition. Exporters sell goods of different 
qualities to consumers who have heterogeneous 
preferences for quality. Production is subject to de-
creasing returns to scale and, therefore, supply and 
the toughness of competition react to cost changes 
brought about by exchange rate fluctuations. First, 
we predict that exchange rate shocks are imper-
fectly passed through into prices. Second, prices of 
low quality goods are more sensitive to exchange 
rate shocks than prices of high quality goods. 
Third, in response to an exchange rate apprecia-
tion, the composition of exports shifts towards 
higher quality and more expensive goods. We test 
these predictions using highly disaggregated price 
and quantity U.S. import data. We find evidence 
that in response to an exchange rate appreciation, 
the composition of exports shifts towards high unit 
price goods. Therefore, exchange rate pass-through 
rates that are measured using aggregate data will 
tend to overstate the actual extent of pass-through.
Published as “Exchange Rate Pass-Through in a 
Competitive Model of Pricing-to-Market” in Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking, Supplement to 
vol. 41, no. 1, 2009, pp. 151–75. 
-
No. 24
How Successful Is the G7 in Managing 
Exchange Rates?
Marcel Fratzscher
abstract: The paper assesses the extent to which 
the Group of Seven (G7) has been successful in its 
management of major currencies since the 1970s. 
Using an event-study approach, the paper finds 
evidence that the G7 has been overall effective 
in moving the U.S. dollar, yen and euro in the in-
tended direction at horizons of up to three months 
after G7 meetings, but not at longer horizons. 
While the success of the G7 is partly dependent on 
the market environment, it is also to a significant 
degree endogenous to the policy process itself. The 
findings indicate that the reputation and cred-
ibility of the G7, as well as its ability to form and 
communicate a consensus among individual G7 
members, are important determinants for the G7’s 
ability to manage major currencies. The paper con-
cludes by analyzing the factors that help the G7 
build reputation and consensus and by discussing 
the implications for global economic governance.
Published as “How Successful Is the G7 in Manag-
ing Exchange Rates?” in the Journal of Internation-
al Economics, vol. 79, no. 1, 2009, pp. 78–88.
No. 25
Do China and Oil Exporters Influence 
Major Currency Configurations?
Marcel Fratzscher and Arnaud Mehl
abstract: This paper analyses the impact of the 
shift away from a U.S. dollar focus of systemically 
important emerging market economies (EMEs) 
on configurations between the U.S. dollar, the 
euro and the yen. Given the difficulty that fixed or 
managed U.S. dollar exchange rate regimes remain 
pervasive and reserve compositions mostly kept 
secret, the identification strategy of the paper is 
to analyse the market impact on major currency 
pairs of official statements made by EME poli-
cymakers about their exchange rate regime and 
reserve composition. Developing a novel database 
for 18 EMEs, we find that such statements not only 
have a statistically but also an economically sig-
nificant impact on the euro, and to a lesser extent 
the yen against the U.S. dollar. The findings suggest 
that communication hinting at a weakening of 
EMEs’ U.S. dollar focus contributed substantially to 
the appreciation of the euro against the U.S. dollar 
in recent years. Interestingly, EME policymakers 
appear to have become more cautious in their 
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underscore the growing systemic importance of 
EMEs for global exchange rate configurations.
Published as “Do China and Oil Exporters Influ-
ence Major Currency Configurations?” in Journal 




Marlene Amstad and Andreas M. Fischer
abstract: This paper estimates monthly pass-
through ratios from import prices to consumer 
prices in real time. Conventional time series meth-
ods impose restrictions to generate exogenous 
shocks on exchange rates or import prices when 
estimating pass-through coefficients. Instead, 
a natural experiment based on data releases 
defines our shock to foreign prices. Our estimation 
strategy follows an event-study approach based 
on monthly releases in import prices. Projections 
from a dynamic common factor model with daily 
panels before and after monthly releases of import 
prices define the shock. This information shock 
allows us to recover a monthly pass-through ratio. 
We apply our identification procedure to Swiss 
prices and find strong evidence that the monthly 
pass-through ratio is around 0.3. Our real-time 
estimates yield higher pass-through ratios than 
time series estimates.
No. 27
International Portfolios, Capital Accu-
mulation and Foreign Assets Dynamics
Nicolas Coeurdacier, Robert Kollmann and 
Philippe Martin
abstract: Despite the liberalization of capital 
flows among OECD countries, equity home bias 
remains sizable. We depart from the two familiar 
explanations of equity home bias: transaction 
costs that impede international diversification, 
and terms of trade responses to supply shocks that 
provide risk sharing, so that there is little incentive 
to hold diversified portfolios. We show that the 
interaction of the following ingredients generates 
a realistic equity home bias: capital accumulation, 
shocks to the efficiency of physical investment, as 
well as international trade in stocks and bonds. 
In our model, domestic stocks are used to hedge 
fluctuations in local wage income. Terms of trade 
risk is hedged using bonds denominated in local 
goods and in foreign goods. In contrast to related 
models, the low level of international diversifica-
tion does not depend on strongly countercyclical 
terms of trade. The model also reproduces the 
cyclical dynamics of foreign asset positions and of 
international capital flows.
Published as “International Portfolios, Capital 
Accumulation and Foreign Assets Dynamics” in 
Journal of International Economics, vol. 80, no. 1, 
2010, pp. 100–12.
No. 28
Investment and  Trade Patterns in a 
Sticky-Price, Open-Economy Model
Enrique Martínez-García and Jens Søndergaard
abstract: This paper develops a tractable two-
country DSGE model with sticky prices à la Calvo 
(1983) and local-currency pricing. We analyze 
the capital investment decision in the presence of 
adjustment costs of two types, the capital adjust-
ment cost (CAC) specification and the invest-
ment adjustment cost (IAC) specification. We 
compare the investment and trade patterns with 
adjustment costs against those of a model without 
adjustment costs and with (quasi-) flexible prices. 
We show that having adjustment costs results 
into more volatile consumption and net exports, 
and less volatile investment. We document three 
important facts on U.S. trade: a) the S-shaped 
cross-correlation function between real GDP and 
the real net exports share, b) the J-curve between 
terms of trade and net exports, and c) the weak 
and S-shaped cross-correlation between real GDP 
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costs tends to reduce the model’s ability to match 
these stylized facts. Nominal rigidities cannot ac-
count for these features either.
Published as “Investment and Trade Patterns in a 
Sticky-Price, Open-Economy Model” in The Eco-
nomics of Imperfect Markets: The Effect of Market 
Imperfections on Economic Decision-Making, 
Giorgio Calcagnini and Enrico Saltari, ed., New 
York: Springer, 2009 
No. 29
Monetary Policy Strategy in a 
Global Environment
Philippe Moutot and Giovanni Vitale
abstract: Since the mid-1980s the world economy 
has gone through profound transformations of 
which the sources and effects are probably not yet 
completely understood. The process of continu-
ous integration in trade, production and financial 
markets across countries and economic regions—
which is what is generally defined as “globaliza-
tion”—affects directly the conduct of monetary 
policy in a variety of respects. The aim of this paper 
is to present an overview of the structural implica-
tions of globalization for the domestic economies 
of developed countries and to deduct from these 
implications lessons for the conduct of monetary 
policy, and in particular the assessment of risks to 
price stability.
Published as “Monetary Policy Strategy in a Global 
Environment, “ European Central Bank, Occasion-
al Paper, no. 106, August 2009. 
No. 30
Insulation Impossible: Fiscal 
Spillovers in a Monetary Union
Russell Cooper, Hubert Kempf and Dan Peled
abstract: This paper studies the effects of mone-
tary policy rules in a monetary union. The focus of 
the analysis is on the interaction between the fiscal 
policy of member countries (regions) and the cen-
tral monetary authority. When capital markets are 
integrated, the fiscal policy of one country will in-
fluence equilibrium wages and interest rates. Thus, 
there are fiscal spillovers within a federation. The 
magnitude and direction of these spillovers, in par-
ticular the presence of a crowding out effect, can 
be influenced by the choice of monetary policy 
rules. We find that there does not exist a monetary 
policy rule that completely insulates agents in one 
region from fiscal policy in another. Some familiar 
policy rules, such as pegging an interest rate, can 
provide partial insulation.
No. 31
Fiscal Stabilization with Partial 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Erasmus K. Kersting
abstract: This paper examines the role of fiscal sta-
bilization policy in a two-country framework that 
allows for a general degree of exchange rate pass-
through. I derive analytical solutions for optimal 
monetary and fiscal policy which are shown to 
depend on the degree of pass-through. In the case 
of partial pass-through, an optimizing policymaker 
uses countercyclical fiscal stabilization in addition 
to monetary stabilization. However, in the extreme 
cases of complete or zero pass-through, the fiscal 
stabilization instrument is not employed. There 
is also no additional gain from the fiscal instru-
ment in the case of coordination between the two 
countries. These results are due to the specific 
way the optimal fiscal policy rule affects marginal 
costs: Rather than being a substitute for monetary 
policy, fiscal policy complements it by increasing 
the correlation of the marginal cost terms within 
and across countries. This in turn makes monetary 
policy more effective at stabilizing them.34   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas • Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2009 Annual Report
No. 32
Has Globalization  Transformed U.S. 
Macroeconomic Dynamics?
Fabio Milani
abstract: This paper estimates a structural New 
Keynesian model to test whether globalization 
has changed the behavior of U.S. macroeconomic 
variables. Several key coefficients in the model—
such as the slopes of the Phillips and IS curves, 
the sensitivities of domestic inflation and output 
to “global” output, and so forth—are allowed in the 
estimation to depend on the extent of globalization 
(modeled as the changing degree of openness to 
trade of the economy), and, therefore, they be-
come time-varying. The empirical results indicate 
that globalization can explain only a small part of 
the reduction in the slope of the Phillips curve. The 
sensitivity of U.S. inflation to global measures of 
output may have increased over the sample, but 
it remains very small. The changes in the IS curve 
caused by globalization are similarly modest. Glo-
balization does not seem to have led to an attenu-
ation in the effects of monetary policy shocks. The 
nested closed economy specification still appears 
to provide a substantially better fit of U.S. data than 
various open economy specifications with time-
varying degrees of openness. Some time variation 
in the model coefficients over the postwar sample 
exists, particularly in the volatilities of the shocks, 
but it is unlikely to be related to globalization.
No. 33
Global Slack and Domestic Inflation 
Rates: A Structural Investigation for 
G-7 Countries
Fabio Milani
abstract: Recent papers have argued that one im-
plication of globalization is that domestic inflation 
rates may have now become more a function of 
“global,” rather than domestic, economic condi-
tions, as postulated by closed-economy Phillips 
curves. This paper aims to assess the empiri-
cal importance of global output in determining 
domestic inflation rates by estimating a structural 
model for a sample of G-7 economies. The model 
can capture the potential effects of global output 
fluctuations on both the aggregate supply and the 
aggregate demand relations in the economy, and it 
is estimated using full-information Bayesian meth-
ods. The empirical results reveal a significant effect 
of global output on aggregate demand in most 
countries. Through this channel, global economic 
conditions can indirectly affect inflation. The 
results, instead, do not seem to provide evidence 
in favor of altering domestic Phillips curves to in-
clude global slack as an additional driving variable 
for inflation.
No. 34
Should Monetary Policy 
“Lean or Clean”?
William R. White
abstract: It has been contended by many in the 
central banking community that monetary policy 
would not be effective in “leaning” against the 
upswing of a credit cycle (the boom) but that 
lower interest rates would be effective in “cleaning” 
up (the bust) afterwards. In this paper, these two 
propositions (can’t lean, but can clean) are exam-
ined and found seriously deficient. In particular, it 
is contended in this paper that monetary policies 
designed solely to deal with short-term problems 
of insufficient demand could make medium-term 
problems worse by encouraging a buildup of debt 
that cannot be sustained over time. The conclusion 
reached is that monetary policy should be more 
focused on “preemptive tightening” to moderate 
credit bubbles than on “preemptive easing” to 
deal with the aftereffects. There is a need for a new 
macrofinancial stability framework that would 
use both regulatory and monetary instruments to 
resist credit bubbles and thus promote sustainable 
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No. 35
European Hoarding: Currency Use 
Among Immigrants in Switzerland
Andreas M. Fischer
abstract: Do immigrants have a higher demand 
for large-denominated banknotes than natives? 
This study examines whether cash orders for CHF 
1000 notes, a banknote not used for daily transac-
tions, is concentrated in Swiss cities with a high 
foreign-to-native ratio. Controlling for a range of 
socio-economic indicators across 250 Swiss cities, 
European immigrants in Switzerland are found to 
hoard fewer CHF 1000 banknotes than natives. A 
1 percent increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio 
leads to a reduction in currency orders by CHF 
4000. This negative correlation between immi-
grant-to-native ratio and currency orders for CHF 
1000 notes holds irrespective of the European 
immigrants’ country of origin. Hoarding of large- 
denominated banknotes by natives is attributed to 
tax avoidance.
No. 36
Can Long-Horizon Forecasts Beat the 
Random Walk Under the Engel–West 
Explanation?
Charles Engel, Jian Wang and Jason Wu
abstract: Engel and West (EW, 2005) argue that 
as the discount factor gets closer to one, present-
value asset pricing models place greater weight 
on future fundamentals. Consequently, current 
fundamentals have very weak forecasting power 
and exchange rates appear to follow approxi-
mately a random walk. We connect the Engel–
West explanation to the studies of exchange rates 
with long-horizon regressions. We find that under 
EW’s assumption that fundamentals are I(1) and 
observable to the econometrician, long-horizon 
regressions generally do not have significant 
forecasting power. However, when EW’s assump-
tions are violated in a particular way, our analytical 
results show that there can be substantial power 
improvements for long-horizon regressions, even 
if the power of the corresponding short-horizon 
regression is low. We simulate population R-
squared for long-horizon regressions in the latter 
setting, using Monetary and Taylor rule models of 
exchange rates calibrated to the data. Simulations 
show that long-horizon regression can have sub-
stantial forecasting power for exchange rates.
No. 37
Global, Local, and Contagious Inves-
tor Sentiment
Malcolm Baker, Jeffrey Wurgler and Yu Yuan
abstract: We construct indexes of investor senti-
ment for six major stock markets and decompose 
them into one global and six local indexes. Relative 
market sentiment is correlated with the relative 
prices of dual-listed companies, validating the in-
dexes. Both global and local sentiment are contrar-
ian predictors of the time series of major markets’ 
returns. They are also contrarian predictors of the 
time series of cross-sectional returns within major 
markets: When sentiment from either global or 
local sources is high, future returns are low on 
various categories of difficult-to-arbitrage and 
difficult-to-value stocks. Sentiment appears to be 
contagious across markets based on tests involv-
ing capital flows, and this presumably contributes 
to the global component of sentiment. 
No. 38
A Model of International Cities: Impli-
cations for Real Exchange Rates
Mario J. Crucini and Hakan Yilmazkuday
abstract: We develop a model of cities each inhab-
ited by two agents, one specializing in manufactur-
ing, the other in retail distribution. The distribution 
sector represents the physical transformation of all 
internationally traded goods from the factory gate 
to the final consumer. Using a panel of micro-pric-
es at the city level, we decompose the cross-sec-
tional variance of long-run LOP deviations into the 
fraction due to distribution costs, trade costs and a 
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for 50 percent of the variance, distribution costs 
account for 10 percent with 40 percent of the vari-
ance unexplained. Since the sample of items in the 
data are heavily skewed toward traded goods, we 
also decompose the variance based on the median 
good on an expenditure-weighted basis. Now the 
tables turn, with distribution costs accounting for 
43 percent, trade costs 36 percent and 21 percent 
of the variance unexplained.
No. 39
State-Dependent Pricing, Local-
Currency Pricing, and Exchange Rate 
Pass-Through
Anthony Landry
abstract: This paper presents a two-country DSGE 
model with state-dependent pricing as in Dotsey, 
King, and Wolman (1999) in which firms price-
discriminate across countries by setting prices in 
local currency. In this model, a domestic monetary 
expansion has greater spillover effects to foreign 
prices and foreign economic activity than an 
otherwise identical model with time-dependent 
pricing. In addition, the predictions of the state-
dependent pricing model match the business-
cycle moments better than the predictions of the 
time-dependent pricing model when driven by 
monetary policy shocks.
No. 40
Business Cycles and Remittances: Can 
the Beveridge–Nelson Decomposition 
Provide New Evidence?
Roberto Coronado
abstract: In this paper, I analyze the business cycle 
properties of remittances and output series for 
three pairs of countries: United States–Mexico, 
United States–El Salvador, and Germany–Turkey. 
Using an unobserved components state-space 
model (via the Beveridge–Nelson decomposition), 
I decompose the remittances and output series 
into stochastic permanent and cyclical compo-
nents. I then use the resulting stationary cyclical 
components to estimate co-movements between 
remittances and output series. Empirical results 
indicate that remittances are countercyclical with 
all the home countries: Mexico, El Salvador and 
Turkey. With respect to source countries, remit-
tances to Mexico are countercyclical with the 
United States business cycle, while remittances 
from the United States to El Salvador and remit-
tances from Germany to Turkey are strongly 
procyclical with output fluctuations in the source 
country. The contribution of this paper to the 
literature is twofold: (1) I use high-frequency data 
(quarterly) for a relatively long period of time; 
and (2) I employ more recent and sophisticated 
econometric techniques in the decomposition of 
the series into stochastic permanent and cyclical 
components. The existing literature lacks both of 
these important aspects of my analysis. I show that 
once both of these factors are incorporated into 
the analysis, empirical results are more aligned to 
those predicted by economic theory.
Working Papers Issued from October 2007 
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No. 1
Is Openness Inflationary? Imperfect Compe-
tition and Monetary Market Power 
Richard W. Evans
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A Monetary Model of the Exchange Rate 
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Cross-Border Returns Differentials
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Published as “Cross Border Returns Differentials” in 
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No. 7
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Cristina Arellano and Ananth Ramanarayanan
No. 20
An International Perspective on 
Oil Price Shocks and U.S. 
Economic Activity
Nathan S. Balke, Stephen P. A. Brown and 
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Facing Troubles in an 
Era of Globalization
A Conversation with Nathan Sheets
Q. For more than a year, we’ve been 
trying to contain a global financial 
crisis. What went wrong?
A. The global economy has sustained the most 
intense and far-reaching financial shock in at least 
50 years, a truly phenomenal financial shock. A 
number of factors have contributed to it. Most 
important, our major financial institutions weren’t 
managing risk in a careful and prudent way. 
There’s plenty of blame to go around. We should 
also include credit rating agencies, the regulators, 
corporate boards and investors. There was a break-
down in the capacity to analyze and understand 
the risk in the system.
A lot of folks see this crisis as first and fore-
most about housing. I see housing being more of 
a trigger that brought this failure of risk manage-
ment to light.
Q. What does all this mean for your 
bailiwick—international finance? 
A. The implications for the financial system are 
profound. We’ve seen a huge increase in risk aver-
sion among investors. We’ve seen marked stresses 
in various kinds of financial markets, ranging from 
very short-term interbank markets all the way to 
longer-term debt markets. Equity prices have fallen 
significantly. There aren’t many markets that have 
escaped the blow. 
We’re now seeing those financial shocks 
having a real impact on spending, production and 
GDP across the globe. I see this occurring through 
three important channels. 
First, banks’ willingness to lend has signifi-
cantly deteriorated, so firms and individuals aren’t 
getting the credit they need. 
Second, we’ve seen a huge adverse wealth 
shock. With stock markets down as much as 50 
percent and housing prices falling in a number of 
countries, people don’t have the balance sheets to 
sustain spending. 
Third, the financial developments have hit 
consumer and business confidence. It’s true in the 
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U.S., U.K. and euro area, where the financial shock 
has been intense, but it’s also true in emerging-
market economies, where they didn’t have the 
financial exposure. 
Q. How has the accelerating global-
ization of recent decades shaped this 
crisis?
A. The fact that we’re more globalized now has 
been one of the extraordinary features of this crisis. 
You look at trends in many financial markets—the 
U.S. line, the U.K. line, the euro-area line, the Japan 
line—and they’re all moving together more or less 
in lockstep. The degree of integration has been 
phenomenal.
Part of that is a reflection of the fact that 
our financial markets were highly integrated, so 
subprime loans issued here ended up on foreign 
balance sheets. We’re also very integrated through 
trade channels, meaning that the slowdown that’s 
occurred as a result of this financial shock has hit 
other economies and fed back into ours. 
One way of framing this is the debate about 
decoupling. If the U.S. economy slows or U.S. 
financial markets encounter problems, what does 
that mean for the rest of the world? There really 
was quite an argument about decoupling until 
about six months ago, centered on the question of 
whether other countries could avoid the troubles 
brewing in the United States. Now, it’s clear that we 
rise and fall together. 
Given the degree of integration and similar 
failures of risk management across the world, I 
think this episode is in some sense deeper than it 
would have been otherwise. 
That doesn’t mean that there aren’t many 
positive factors from globalization. There are 
important efficiency gains, for example, but we’re 
seeing that we’re tied together and that we have 
many common vulnerabilities and shortcomings. 
We need to work together to manage these chal-
lenges and the responses to them.
Q. How does the international dimen-
sion affect the Fed’s analysis and 
actions?
A. Let me give you a concrete example. Many 
financial institutions outside the U.S. have had 
significant demand for short-term dollar fund-
ing. They made loans to corporations in dollars or 
bought U.S.-denominated assets, and they needed 
dollars to fund those assets. I can’t think of a previ-
ous instance of financial stress associated with 
such pronounced demand for dollars outside our 
borders.
The interbank markets these institutions 
depended on for funding essentially froze up last 
fall, and it created huge excess demand for short-
term dollar liquidity abroad. Many of these foreign 
institutions would come to New York or other U.S. 
markets in search of dollars, so it would at times 
spill over into our markets and create stresses. 
In response, the Fed joined with other major 
central banks to create a network of swap facili-
ties, where we provide foreign central banks dollar 
liquidity and they give us an equivalent amount 
of their currencies. They then lend these dollars to 
financial institutions in their economies that need 
them. There’s very little risk for the Fed. We have 
claims on the foreign central banks as well as hold-
ings of their currencies to protect us. 
We have had to extend the scope and influ-
ence of our liquidity facilities beyond our national 
borders, and that’s been a new challenge.
Q. Has globalization put greater 
emphasis on cooperation with other 
central banks? 
A. Absolutely. Central banks regularly commu-
nicated through mechanisms that were already 
in place, but the global stresses we’ve been facing 
have made it all the more important that central 
banks interact to keep each other informed and, 
where possible, even coordinate policy.
The swap agreements are an important 
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est rate cuts by the Fed and other central banks 
in early October. Easing monetary policy was in 
the interest of each of these economies, but there’s 
a strong additional statement that’s made when 
central banks show they’re cooperating to address 
global problems.
Q. What else will help us deal with 
global financial threats?
A. These aren’t just Fed issues but matters of the 
broader financial architecture. We need better 
mechanisms to address problems faced by very 
large institutions that can be seen as too big to fail. 
We also need a well-articulated resolution process 
for a wider range of financial institutions. We have 
a good mechanism for addressing commercial 
banks under stress, but there’s nothing comparable 
for some other types of institutions. 
Q. More broadly, has globalization 
affected the way the Federal Reserve 
does its job?
A. It’s certainly different. These dollar-funding 
pressures I mentioned earlier are a manifestation 
of just how much things have changed. We see this 
increased interdependence among economies 
and the need for collaboration among central 
banks and regulators in various countries. 
Some people have argued that the effective-
ness of monetary policy is being diminished, 
and I don’t see that. Globalization has shifted 
the range of variables and the things you need to 
think about. You need to focus not only on what’s 
going on within your own borders and your own fi-
nancial markets but also on what’s going on in the 
rest of the world and in global financial markets. 
There are feedback effects that are significant for 
assessing economic conditions and making policy 
decisions.
We’re constantly trying to expand our analyti-
cal tool kit and improve our understanding of how 
economies and policies work. It’s not explicitly 
global, but one issue we’re thinking hard about at 
the moment is the so-called financial accelerator 
effect, where sharp declines in asset prices hit the 
balance sheets of firms and individuals and make 
them less creditworthy. This can be a mechanism 
through which these kinds of financial shocks eat 
into the economy and become quite intense. 
Another current issue is the zero lower 
bound. What are the implications for policy and 
the economy once short-term interest rates, the 
traditional tool for monetary policy, have been cut 
to nearly zero. What’s the next step? 
Q. How will this financial crisis affect 
the pace of globalization? 
A. If anything, it may accelerate globalization in 
the sense that we’re now very aware that we need 
to work closely together with other countries on 
such things as financial-sector supervision and 
rating assets. Major financial institutions are truly 
global in scope, and if we’re approaching things 
one way and the French another and the Germans 
another and the British another, it creates disso-
nance in the global economy. 
The leaders of the G-20 economies met in No-
vember in Washington, and they’re going to meet 
again in early April in London. They’re in the midst 
of addressing many of these issues in a global way, 
and I think we’ll find that process has some staying 
power. We’ll end up more integrated, more coher-
ent and more consistent across countries than we 
were before this crisis erupted. 
Along the way, there’s risk of protectionism 
emerging. History teaches that we’re more pros-
perous if we’re open rather than closed—especially 
at times like this. Think about what happened 
in the Great Depression, when countries put up 
sizable tariffs and global trade collapsed. That can 
start a downward spiral for the global economy, so 
we have to guard very forcefully against protec-
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